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A trust charter is a side door to the payment system. Open it in daylight

Modern Treasury has asked to become a national trust bank. The charter is a legitimate thing to want — but the Comptroller should publish what it permits, and what it does not, before granting the next one.

FinOpine deskOctober 6, 20264 min readmachine-drafted, human-checked
What this is about

In the United States a bank needs a licence, called a charter. Most charters allow a bank to take government-insured deposits and lend. An older, narrower one — the national trust charter — covers firms that hold and administer money and assets for other people rather than lending it out. Several technology companies that move payments have now applied for that narrower charter, and a trade group representing small banks has sued the regulator that grants them.

Our view

A trust charter is a reasonable thing to want, and escaping state-by-state money transmitter licensing is a worthy goal. But the Comptroller should publish what the charter permits, and whether it implies access to the payment system, before granting the next one.

A company whose entire business is moving other people’s money has asked to become a bank that cannot take deposits.

Modern Treasury, which builds infrastructure for global money movement, said on Monday it has applied to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency — the federal agency that licenses national banks — to establish Modern Treasury National Trust Bank. It is not alone. Rain filed for the same kind of charter, and both join a lengthening queue of technology firms. Three days before, the Independent Community Bankers of America sued the Comptroller, arguing the agency lacks authority to charter crypto firms outside the traditional banking framework.

The oldest charter in the cabinet

A national trust bank is a federally licensed bank whose business is fiduciary — holding, safekeeping and administering assets for other people rather than lending their money out. It does not fund itself with insured deposits and does not run a loan book. The usual anxiety about a thinly capitalised newcomer gambling with insured savings simply does not arise, which is precisely why the charter is attractive to firms that would never survive the scrutiny applied to a full deposit-taking bank.

What the charter does offer is three things worth having. One federal licence in place of state money transmitter licences obtained one jurisdiction at a time. Federal law that overrides inconsistent state requirements. And, not least, the commercial credibility of federal supervision when your customers are themselves regulated institutions. “Supervised by the Comptroller” is a product feature before it is a compliance burden.

None of that is illegitimate. The state money transmitter regime is genuinely poor regulation: overlapping licences, inconsistent net worth and permissible investment rules, and a supervisory design built for storefront wire transfer shops. A firm asking for one supervisor instead of dozens is not shopping for the softest touch. It is asking for the thing a national banking system was supposed to provide.

The question the application does not answer

Here is what the public record does not tell you: what this bank would be permitted to do. The charter is defined by fiduciary activity, but the distance between “we hold assets as trustee” and “we operate the ledger on which your payments settle” is enormous, and it is exactly where the argument lives. Does holding customer balances pending settlement count as a fiduciary activity or as deposit-taking by another name? Can a trust bank issue a liability redeemable on demand? May it settle for its own account?

Those questions are being answered one application at a time, in conditions letters and operating agreements that almost nobody reads. The Comptroller may well be answering them carefully. The public cannot tell, and neither can the next applicant, which is why the queue keeps forming and the trade groups keep litigating.

The decision the Comptroller does not get to make

Behind all of this sits a master account at the Federal Reserve — the account through which an institution reaches the payment system directly rather than renting access from a correspondent bank. The Comptroller grants charters. The Reserve Banks decide account access. A charter does not come with an account, and the Fed has said as much.

But a charter changes the conversation, and everyone involved knows it. If a trust charter is becoming the standard credential for asking the central bank for direct access, then an agency that does not own the plumbing is shaping who queues at the door. That is not a scandal. It is a reason to write the reasoning down.

The strongest case against this

The best argument against me is that chartering has always been case-by-case, and rightly so. A published bright-line rule would be gamed within a quarter and would freeze a set of business models that nobody fully understands yet. The Comptroller already imposes capital, liquidity and operating conditions on new charters, and the loudest critics are incumbents with an obvious interest in keeping the door shut — a community bank trade association suing to limit competition is not a neutral guardian of the perimeter.

All true. But it is an argument for publishing the standard, not for withholding it. Discretionary licensing is defensible when the reasoning is public; it is only arbitrary when it is not. And the alternative is already visible: a trade group in court, and a judge rather than a supervisor drawing the line between a trust company and a bank.

What publication would look like

It is not complicated. With each trust charter decision, the Comptroller should publish the fiduciary activities it relied on and their expected share of the bank’s revenue; the activities the bank may not conduct without a further filing, named specifically — settlement for own account, issuing demand-redeemable liabilities, holding customer balances beyond a stated period; the capital and liquidity conditions attached; and an express statement that the charter carries no presumption whatsoever about Federal Reserve account access.

That is four paragraphs of text. It would tell every subsequent applicant what the test is, give the litigants something concrete to argue about, and let the rest of us judge whether the perimeter has moved.

The Comptroller of the Currency should publish a written licensing standard for national trust charters — what fiduciary activity it requires, what activities are excluded, and what conditions attach — before acting on the applications now in front of it, and should attach a public conditions letter to every approval. The Federal Reserve should say separately and plainly how it will treat master account applications from newly chartered trust banks, so that neither agency can be assumed to have decided what the other has not.

What would change this view

I am wrong if the Comptroller, when it acts on the Modern Treasury application, publishes a conditions letter that sets out the fiduciary activities relied on, names the activities the bank may not conduct without a further filing, states the capital and liquidity conditions, and says expressly whether the charter carries any presumption about Federal Reserve account access.

If that document appears, the perimeter is public and the complaint collapses — supervision by published condition is exactly what case-by-case licensing is supposed to mean. If it does not appear, the courts will draw the perimeter instead, and the agency will have earned the outcome.

Worked from

  1. Modern Treasury applies to establish national bank trust
    Finextra · 2026-10-05
United States. Opinion and commentary of general circulation. Not investment advice and not personalised to any reader.